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U.S. farm policy has undergone a series of premium subsidy increases since 1994 to 
make crop insurance more affordable to farmers. Previous research shows that subsidized 
crop insurance may cause farmers to shift or expand their production. This study models 
the acreage response of U.S. cotton at the county level to subsidized crop insurance using 
simultaneous insurance participation and acreage response equations. Results of panel 
data analyses from 1995 to 2005 suggest that higher insurance benefits, such as subsidy 
per unit of production, encourages crop insurance participation which then stimulates 
additional cotton acreage. In addition, counties with relatively low yields are more 
responsive to insurance participation and acreage than high yielding counties. Empirical 
evidence implies that crop insurance policies for cotton are shifting the regional 
comparative advantage of production from relatively high yielding and quality counties 
to lower yielding and quality counties. 
 
 
Key words:  subsidy per pound, rate of return, simultaneous, panel, fixed effects Technological advances, market conditions, and government programs are a few of the 
many factors that affect cotton plantings and production. Congress formed the Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) in 1938 with the objective to protect farm income 
from crop failure and low prices plus protect consumers from food and fiber shortages 
and high prices.  Crop insurance was further expanded upon the Crop Insurance Act of 
1994 which brought about major changes in affordability and return for producer 
participation through 'catastrophic' (CAT) protection. The entire insurance premium for 
CAT was paid for by the government and producers pay a modest sign-up fee for each 
crop. Cotton acreage under insurance increased from 5.8 million acres to 15.8 million 
acres from 1994 to 1995.
1 The increase in participation is not surprising because the 
Congress required farmers to purchase crop insurance to be eligible of any disaster 
payments. 
Six years after the introduction of CAT, the Congress implemented the 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) which significantly increased premium subsidy 
rates across the board. This made crop insurance program more affordable to all cotton 
producers regardless of production risks faced by each county. Cotton producers received 
additional premium subsidies amounting to about $1.2 billion from 2000 to 2001, the 
year when ARPA took effect. In effect, about 14.68 million cotton acres were insured in 
2001, the largest net acreage ever insured for cotton. 
The effect of subsidized crop insurance reform on farmers' cropping decisions has 
been an important debate for many years. Because the probability of yield falling below 
                                                 
1 However, most of the insured acreage in 1995 was under CAT as around only 30% of the total acreage 
insured was at Buy Up levels. 50 percent of an established yield for a farm varies greatly by region and crop, the impact 
of crop insurance reform is not expected to be equal across the cotton belt. To the extent 
that crop insurance affects farmers' cropping decisions, it is important to quantify how 
changes in crop insurance policies cause farmers to alter their participation and planting 
decisions. 
Cotton, a highly subsidized crop, has received about 11.6% of the total USDA 
subsidies from 1995 to 2005. As shown in table 1, subsidies for cotton increased by more 
than $600 million from 1995 to 1996 while total USDA subsidies did not change much. 
Aside from the subsidized crop insurance program, many other factors such as the rapid 
spread of Bt cotton, the “freedom to plant act”, the counter-cyclical payments to bolster 
income when U.S. cotton prices are below the target price and other cotton policies in the 
global market contributed to the expansion of cotton production.  
  Previous studies 
Acreage response due to farm programs, particularly farm subsidized crop 
insurance has been an important topic among researchers (Duffy et al. 1987;  Keeton and 
Skees 1999.;  Wu 1999;  Vandeveer and Young 2001;  Wu and Adams 2001;  Barnett et 
al. 2002.;  Goodwin et al. 2004;  Deal 2004.). Most of these studies focus on corn, 
soybeans, wheat or crop mix. Only a few address the impacts of subsidized crop 
insurance for cotton and the ability for cotton producers to respond to crop insurance 
subsidies was rather limited until the 1996 FAIR Act.  
Crop insurance has received a fair bit of attention not only by politicians but also 
by agricultural economists. Knight and Coble (1997) outlined econometric studies examining issues related to the Multiple Peril Crop Insurance program since the 1980s. 
They considered studies on acreage effects of MPCI and other insurance programs as 
important areas for future research. 
Some studies provide contradicting results about the size of the effect. Keeton and 
Skees (1999) studied acreage shifts for six major U.S. crops from 1978 to 1982 and 1988 
to 1992. Their findings show that crop insurance has created incentives for farmers to 
plant more acres, especially in more risky areas. Estimates show that crop insurance 
subsidies in the 1980s led to about 50 million additional cropland acres. 
Using the national policy simulation model of POLYSYS-ERS, Young et al. 
(2001) show market impacts across seven regions for the eight largest commodities in the 
U.S. Their simulation results suggest that an additional 960,000 acres has been added 
from crop insurance subsidies with wheat and cotton accounting for about 75 percent of 
the total increase.  
Similarly, a recent study by Goodwin et al. (2004) found that the expansion of 
crop insurance programs has not induced large acreage increases. Acreage response, 
insurance participation, input usage and CRP participation were jointly evaluated in the 
Heartland region for corn and soybeans and in the Northern Great Plains for wheat and 
barley from 1985 to 1993, using a pooled cross-sectional time series model. The elasticity 
of acreage response to changes in insurance participation for corn, soybeans and barley 
were 0.014, 0.0025, and 0.19 respectively. Results of policy simulations suggest that 
large premium decreases (30%) caused planted acreage to increase by about 1.1% for 
barley and only about 0.28% to 0.49% for corn.   Most of these acreage response studies have focused on crops other than cotton 
until recently, an unpublished report by Barnett et al. (2002), examined the impacts of 
crop insurance on cotton planted in Mississippi from 1996 to 2000. Using a single 
equation, they modeled cotton acreage as a function of expected net returns per acre for 
cotton and soybeans, a major competing crop in Mississippi. Based on their estimates, 
results showed that on the average, a 1% increase in expected net returns from crop 
insurance would increase cotton acreage by 0.036% while the effect of a 1% increase in 
expected net market returns for cotton would increase cotton acreage by 0.222%. This 
indicates that the relatively larger return in dollars per acre from market factors has more 
influence on cotton plantings than the expected return to insurance.   
Most recently, in an unpublished PhD dissertation by Deal (2004), he attempted to 
examine the relationship between subsidized crop insurance and soil erosion. In one of 
the chapters, Deal (2004) modeled the impact of crop insurance on cotton acreage and 
input usage in the Southern Seaboard, Mississippi Portal and Prairie Gateway regions for 
the two time periods of 1990 to 1995 and 1996 to 2000. Similar to Goodwin et al. (2004), 
he used the instrumental variable technique in the context of GMM to jointly estimate the 
proposed five structural equations. Regression results implied a negative and significant 
relationship between crop insurance participation and cotton acreage in 1990 to 1995 in 
the Mississippi Portal but a positive and significant relationship in the two regions for the 
period 1996 to 2000. Elasticity estimates of cotton acreage response to changes in 
insurance participation were mostly inelastic, ranging from -0.104 to 0.099. Based on 
policy simulations, he found that significant premium rate reductions substantially impact insurance participation but these reductions do not translate to large changes in cotton 
acreage. 
Overall, the literature on cotton’s acreage response to crop insurance programs is 
fairly limited and mostly centers on the Mississippi region. In addition, timing is such 
that these studies had not considered the effect of Bt cotton, which is known to be a major 
technology shifter for some regions and influence farmer's decision making in terms of 
how much land to plant and how much land to insure.  
The primary objective of this study is to quantify changes in insurance 
participation and subsequent acreage responses impacts of the crop insurance program for 
cotton in the United States. Specifically, this study aims to quantify cotton’s acreage 
response to subsidized crop insurance using county level data across the cotton belt over 
a time period when producers had planting flexibility. In addition, factors like Bt cotton 
will be considered so that more defensible conclusions can be drawn for policy. 
  Empirical Model  
 
An unbalanced panel data set of 4,637 pooled annual county-level observations 
was constructed using 577 cotton-producing counties from 1995 to 2005.
2 Data are 
unbalanced in the sense that the number of counties varies over time.
3 Creating a 
                                                 
2 All cotton-producing states are included except for Kansas 
3 Data were obtained from various sources - insurance contract data were collected from the Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) summary of business report while acreage planted, state prices and yield data 
were collected from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). To avoid disclosure of individual 
operations, NASS does not publish acreage values for all counties. Total acres in some counties reported by 
NASS are less than the insured acres reported by RMA. This discrepancy may be due to sampling errors complete panel from an unbalanced panel data for the purpose of computational 
simplification is not recommended since it may cause a large loss in efficiency (Baltagi 
and Chang, 2000). 
Several benefits and limitations of using panel data were enumerated by Hsiao 
(2003) and Baltagi (2005). Increased variability in panel data can yield more insights 
among variables. In addition, panel data increases the degrees of freedom and exhibits 
less collinearity among explanatory variables, thereby improving the efficiency of 
estimates. Most importantly, panel data controls for individual heterogeneity and allows 
better analysis of dynamic adjustments, unlike time-series data and cross sectional data. 
To estimate the effect of crop insurance participation on cotton acreage, a two 
equation system approach is proposed. This takes into consideration the simultaneous 
nature of the decision process - how much land to allocate in cotton production and how 
much land to insure, an approach suggested by Goodwin et al. (2004). Using Baltagi's 
notation, the simultaneous equation model can be written as 
Γyit + Λxit = υit   (1) 
                                                                                                                                                
since NASS uses sample surveys to collect information from farm cooperators to establish county-level 
acreage data. RMA can report acreage values even if a county has only one producer due to the Freedom of 
Information Act. Also, the prevented planting provision in insurance policies contributes to this gap. 
Prevented planting can occur when there is a shortage in irrigation water due to drought, excess moisture to 
plant or other natural causes that may prevent planting during the planting window for a region. The 
producer may opt not to plant the insured crop and file for a prevented planting payment. Land under 
prevented planting is counted under insured acreage but not as planted acreage.  where Γ is an MxM matrix of coefficient of endogenous variables, Λis an MxK matrix 
of coefficient of predetermined variables. M is the number of structural equations in the 
model and K is the number of predetermined variables. it y ,  it x and υit are column vectors 
with dimensions M, K and M, respectively.  it υ denotes the error component structure. 
Equation (1) can also be written in a stacked structural form as, 
 
υ δ + = Z y   (2) 
 
where  ′ y = ′ y1 , ′ y2 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦, Z = diag Z j ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦,  ′ δ = ′ δ1 , ′ δ2 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ and  ′ υ = ′ υ1 , ′ υ2 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦. 
 
The estimation procedure used follows the steps suggested by Cornwell et al. 
(1992) for the fixed effects standard linear simultaneous equation model. Cornwell et al. 
(1992) shows that the traditional maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the structural 
parameters are equivalent to the MLE of the system after a within transformation. The 
random effects model was also estimated using the error component specification for 
simultaneous equations with incomplete panels by Baltagi and Chang (2000) using error 
component three stage least squares (EC3SLS).  
Following Baltagi's EC3SLS, which accounts for the random error component 
structure of an unbalanced panel, δis computed as 
δEC3SLS = Z ′ * P x*Z * ( )
−1
Z ′ * P x*y*  (3) 
 
where Z*=
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− =
2 / 1 * υ , P*
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−1/2 ∑ X  and X is the instrument matrix.  
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where ∑ is the variance-covariance matrix between the error terms and calculated 
using the residuals of a 2SLS procedure. The EC3SLS estimator was derived by Baltagi 
(1981) and is known to perform better than 2SLS and 3SLS in estimating structural 
parameters of a simultaneous equation model with error components. To further verify 
that the fixed effects model is most appropriate, the Hausman test was applied. 
The marginal effects of the chosen interaction terms were calculated from the 
reduced form of the two-equation system. SAS and TSP are used to estimate both 
structural and reduced form models. 
Data 
Data on Bt adoption rates were obtained from the Mississippi State University 
archive of Beltwide Cotton Insect Loss (CIL) data. The data utilized are all at the state 
level due to difficulties in matching regional data with individual counties. Other data 
such as futures prices, average world price for cotton and deficiency payments were 
obtained from Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), USDA. Prices and other economic 
variables were deflated using the CPI for all goods and are in 2007 dollars.  
As mentioned earlier, a systems equation approach is proposed. The two equation 
system proposed is: 
 
  (5)  
  +   (6) 
 
where ACRESit is the percent of crop acreage in county i planted to cotton in year t, 
INSURANCEit is the participation rate for cotton insurance, EXPPRICEit is the expected 
price for the state that county i resides in prior to when planting decisions occur for year 
t, LAGYLDit is yield (lbs./acre) for county i lagged, EXPPRICEit*LAGYLDit is an 
interaction term between price and yield that is also a form of expected revenue, 
YLDVARit represents yield variability for county i, BTit is the adoption rate for Bt cotton 
of the state county i resides in, SUBSIDYPERLBit ($/lb.) is the expected premium 
subsidy, RORit-1 is the rate of return for the producer to buying insurance in t-1 as 
measured by the ratio between total indemnity and producer premium costs (net premium 
plus sign up fee), PICC it is a price index of competing crops for county i, and lastly, D1 
and D2 are period dummies for 2000 to 2001 and 2002 to 2005, respectively, to reflect 
different premium subsidy regimes.  
In order for the systems of equation to be identified, valid instruments are used for 
the insurance participation and cotton acreage equation. SUBSIDYPERLB and ROR are 
used as instruments for the insurance participation equation while PICC is used as an 
instrument in the acreage equation. These instruments are valid in the sense that 
SUBSIDYPERLB and ROR should not directly influence acreage planted to cotton and 
PICC should not directly influence insurance participation. Variables used in the model 
are described in tables 2 and 3 and descriptive statistics are summarized in table 4. The literature measures crop insurance participation in different ways. The 
conventional way of measuring crop insurance participation is simply the ratio of insured 
to total acres planted or in a binary model participation has a value of 1 when insurance is 
purchased and 0 otherwise. Goodwin (1993) proposes an alternative approach to 
measuring participation by considering changes in buy-up coverage levels. Goodwin et 
al. (2004) argues that one can increase insurance participation without increasing acres 
insured by merely increasing the coverage level, which is reflected in total liability. 
Similarly, INSURANCEit equals the total possible liability or maximum liability by 
multiplying the 5-year historical yield for a county by the price election for a given year 
times the maximum price election coverage of 75% for years before 2000 and 85% for 
years 2002 to 2005.  
Variables included to capture influences of market and government incentives and 
technology on farmer's decision making include EXPPRICE, LAGYLD and the 
interaction term between EXPPRICE and LAGYLD. EXPPRICE is calculated using the 
December futures price in February plus the 'November state basis' to incorporate state 
level supply and demand conditions. The expected LDP is incorporated into the basis 
value to capture the effect of government price support programs on EXPPRICE for the 
producer. The December futures price in February is chosen because the sales closing 
date for cotton insurance is in February and this is about the latest date that producers can 
significantly alter their planting decisions for the upcoming cropping year. Basis is the 
difference between the lagged state price a county resides in and the average of the 
lagged December futures prices for the Fridays during the last quarter the contract is traded. This is the most recent basis information available and it corresponds to the 
nearest futures price at the time when a large percentage of cotton is marketed. If the 
AWP is below 52 cents per lb. when producers sell their cotton they are eligible to 




52 − E[AWP] { Otherwise
if  E[AWP] < 52
 
 
E[AWP] = DECfutures + E(BasisLDP)  (9) 
 
E(BasisLDPt) = AWPlqt-1 - DECfutureslqt-1   (10) 
 
where E[AWP] is the expected Adjusted World Price while AWPlq and DECfutureslq are 
the AWP and December futures in the last quarter of the year, respectively.  
The interaction of EXPPRICE and LAGYLD is given by EXPPRICE*LAGYLD. 
EXPPRICE has a mean of $0.747 per lb. It is expected that counties with high yield 
insure less when expected price increases and increase insurance participation when 
expected price goes down. Similarly, counties with high yields are expected to have less 
acreage response when price goes up while counties with very low yield are expected to 
be more responsive to price changes.  
YLDVAR is included to capture yield variability among counties. YLDVAR is 
calculated as the ratio of the moving standard deviation to the moving mean. Having an 
unbalanced panel made construction of this variable difficult. To avoid losing a large 
number of observations, counties with at least one year of historical yield from 1985 to the county's initial year of cotton production are considered. Counties facing high yield 
risks are expected to increase participation. 
ROR measures the rate of return of insurance for producers. This is calculated as 
the proportion of indemnity received to producer costs. Producer costs are calculated as 
the sum of their premiums and administrative fees paid. ROR is expected to be positively 
associated with insurance participation. This variable is also used as an instrument for the 
insurance equation. ROR varies greatly by region and has a mean of 2.387 which means 
that producer benefits derived from insurance are over twice as much as their cost across 
all counties and participating producers. SUBSIDYPERLB is constructed as total premium 
subsidies received in a county divided by the counties 5-year moving average yield. A 
positive association between SUBSIDYPERLB and INSURANCE is expected. 
The introduction of Bt cotton has shifted the competitive advantage of production 
for many regions, particularly those susceptible to bollworms. Higher Bt adoption rates 
would appear to be associated with increased plantings for these regions. On the other 
hand, the effect of Bt adoption on insurance participation may be negative since Bt cotton 
reduces production risk. Table 4 shows that average Bt cotton adoption varies by region. 
The effect of competing crops on cotton acreage is also considered. Wheat, corn 
and soybeans are selected as the major competing crops for all counties. The expected 
price for each crop is constructed using a futures price or loan rate and state basis which 
is the difference between the US average and state price in the previous year. To compare 
these prices, a Laspeyres price index with 1996 as the base year was constructed. For 
















⎟.  (11) 
Price indices of all competing crops are added to get the Price Index of Competing Crops 
(PICC). Note that prices used in the computation are state-level while acres are measured 
at the county-level. Using this measure, more weight is given to the relatively larger 
competing crops in a county. PICC has a mean of 0.956. A high PICC is expected to 
decrease the acreage planted to cotton. This variable is also used as an instrument for the 
acreage equation.  
The counties can be grouped into 4 distinct production regions
4 namely Southeast, 
Delta, Southwest and West regions. Crops yields, prices and hydrological conditions 
differ across production regions. Among the four regions, insurance participation is 
highest in the Southwest region (78.4%) over the sample period. The Southwest region is 
also characterized by counties having low cotton yields, low cotton prices, and high 
production risk. Conversely, insurance participation is lowest in the West region (48.2%) 
where cotton yields and prices are highest and production risk is lowest. Examining the 
subsidy per unit of production across different production regions, it appears that subsidy 
is highest for the Southwest (4 cents/lb) and lowest for the West (1 cent/lb).  Do counties 
in riskier areas benefit more from the subsidized crop insurance?  
                                                 
4 Southeast region includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia; Delta 
region includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee; Southwest region includes 
Oklahoma and Texas; and West region includes Arizona, California and New Mexico. Results 
 
Based on figure 1, total cotton acreage decreased from 1995 to 1998, slowly 
increased from 1998 to 2001, and then declined in 2002. In 1995, the year with the 
highest percent of acreage insured, about 57% of the insured acreage was under CAT 
while only 43% under BUP. High CAT participation is associated with 1994 crop 
insurance legislation which mandated participation in at least CAT to be eligible for farm 
commodity programs. But this requirement was rescinded in the 1996 Farm Bill. A series 
of subsidy increases followed to encourage insurance participation and in effect, insured 
acreage increased, especially at the BUP level. In 2001, about 76% of the insured acreage 
was under BUP while CAT only comprised 24% of the total acreage insured. From 2000 
to 2002, about 56% of the insured acreage was at the 65% coverage level or greater.  
 
Fixed Effects Model 
 
Following Goodwin et al. (2004) a simultaneous framework is employed to 
estimate the effect of subsidized crop insurance program on US cotton acreage. The 
equations are simultaneous because acreage decisions and crop insurance program 
participation decisions are made at the same time. Unlike Goodwin et al. (2004), a panel 
data structure and fixed effects specification
5 was applied. It can be argued that   is 
correlated with the explanatory variables. For example, the location of the county, size of 
county, and land quality can be correlated with the regressors. Therefore, correlation 
                                                 
5 A random effects model was also estimated and the Hausman test was applied to test for model 
specification. However, the Hausman test is not well-defined because of a non-positive definite covariance 
matrix. This may imply that there are no obvious efficiency gains from the random effects model.  between  and the explanatory variables are assumed. Another reason for choosing the 
fixed effects model is that the counties observed are not randomly sampled but more or 





Instruments used for the insurance equation are SUBSIDYPERLB and ROR. The 
estimate of ROR in the insurance equation shows a strong and positive association 
between ROR and crop insurance participation (INSURANCE). Similarly, 
SUBSIDYPERLB is highly significant and positive. If subsidy per lb. of production 
increases then INSURANCE also increases. Generally, counties that receive higher 
subsidy per lb. of production are counties where production risks are high and yields are 
relatively low. Because subsidy rates are structured as a percentage of total premiums, it 
favors high risk and or low yielding counties. Keeton and Skees (1999) suggest targeting 
a per unit of production subsidy so that subsidies will no longer favor high risk regions at 
a cost to low-risk regions.  
The correlation of yield variability and insurance participation is also highly 
significant and positive. High insurance participation among counties having relatively 
higher yield variability or unstable yield is not surprising due to high risks in production 
that these counties face. This is supported by table 4 which shows that the Southwest 
(West) has the highest (lowest) yield variability and level of insurance participation.  
The effects of EXPPRICE, LAGYLD and the interaction term, 
EXPPRICE*LAGYLD, on insurance participation are also included in the model. Based on the marginal effect of expected price, an increase (decrease) in price expectation 
causes a decrease (increase) in insurance participation for counties with relatively high 
yield expectations. On the other hand, the correlation between expected price and 
insurance participation is positive for counties with very low yield but not significant for 
a 95% confidence interval. This finding is very interesting and has important policy 
implications. This will be discussed in the later section of this article. 
Lastly, a positive correlation between Bt cotton adoption rates and insurance 
participation suggests that areas with a high rate of adoption insure more. However, Bt 
cotton is relatively more expensive than non-transgenic varieties and the producer may be 
insuring to protect the repayment of their investment.  
Acreage Response 
 
For the ACRES equation, the instrument is the Price Index of Competing Crops 
(PICC). The estimate for PICC is significant and negative. An increase in the expected 
price of these competing crops causes a decrease in cotton plantings, albeit an inelastic 
response. The effect of YLDVAR on cotton acreage is negative and highly significant. 
Other things equal, counties with high yield variation tend to plant less cotton compared 
to counties with relatively stable yields. High yield variation is also common in dry land 
counties. Similarly, for counties with very low yields, the marginal effect of the price 
expectation on cotton acreage is positive, whereas it is negative for high yielding 
counties. Policy implications of this result are given in the next section. 
The effect of Bt cotton adoption on cotton plantings is negative. While higher 
adoption is generally associated with a technology shift and competitive advantage for these regions, increased yields from Bt cotton decrease the need for more acreage in the 
aggregate. However, the results on Bt adoption are not conclusive since Bt adoption data 
are at the state rather than county level.  
The key result of this research is that the positive and significant correlation 
between insurance participation and cotton acreage. Similar to other studies, the effect of 
insurance is positive and inelastic. The elasticity of acreage with respect to insurance 
participation at data means is about 0.198 while the elasticity of insurance participation 
with respect to subsidy per unit production is 0.0286. Acreage elasticity estimates found 
by other studies are 0.014, 0.0025 and 0.19 for corn, soybean, barley (Goodwin et al. 
2004) and 0.099 for cotton in Mississippi portal and Southern Seaboard (Deal 2004). 
Thus, while our estimated elasticity of acreage with respect to insurance participation is 
still inelastic, our magnitude is almost double that of other studies. 
The fixed effects estimates of the reduced form are given in table 6. Based on 
these results, the subsidy per unit of production positively affects cotton acreage. 
Increasing SUBSIDYPERLB by $0.10 would lead to an increase in ACRES by 0.48%. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant at the data means. The effect of subsidy 
per unit of production on acres is also computed segregating the data by regions and 
results show that the effect of SUBSIDYPERLB on ACRES is positive for the Delta 
(0.293), West (1.398) and Southwest (0.155) regions. The effect is only significant for the 
Southeast and Southwest. However, the estimate for the Southeast region is -0.217, which 
seems counterintuitive. The explanation of the negative effect of SUBSIDYPERLB on 
acres for the Southeast region may be attributed to the larger yield impacts of Bt in the Southeast than other regions and the state level data for Bt adoption. A contribution of 
future studies would be to quantify Bt adoption at the county level to more accurately 
control for the effects of Bt technology on cotton acreage. 
Insurance participation and cotton acreage were also considered by segmenting 
the data into the four regions. Parameter estimates of insurance participation on cotton 
acreage for these regions were positive and significant except for the Delta and West 
regions. Elasticities for the Southeast and Southwest at their data means are 0.26 and 
0.38, respectively. 
Marginal Effects of Expected Price and Yield 
Generally, counties that exhibit the highest cotton yields are those that are 
irrigated or have the lowest production risk. Prices are also relatively higher for irrigated 
counties due to better overall quality. On the other hand, dryland production or counties 
with limited rainfall can be characterized with relatively low yields and high production 
risks. Prices are also generally lower, due in large part to lower quality, as evidenced by 
lower average state prices.  
Based on the parameter estimates and standard errors of the reduced form, the 
marginal effects of EXPPRICE on insurance participation (figure 2) suggest that an 
increase in the price expectation causes a decline in insurance participation among 
counties with relatively higher yields. In counties where yields are relatively high, crop 
insurance participation will decline with a high expected price because the probability of 
receiving indemnity payments in these counties is low. However, a lower price 
expectation may cause counties with very high yields to insure more. On the other hand, counties with very low yields behave differently. The association between expected price 
and insurance participation is positive which is likely due to higher production risks in 
counties with very low yields. 
The marginal effect of EXPPRICE on cotton acreage is given in figure 3. The 
direction of the effect is similar to figure 2 where in the marginal impact of price is 
decreasing in yield. That is, an increase in the expected price has a smaller impact on 
acreage when yield is very high and there is more acreage response from counties with 
extremely low yields. This may indicate that counties with extremely high yields are 
those that are irrigated. Because of limited irrigation water, these counties are not able to 
respond as much as counties with dry land agriculture. Another intuition is that since 
yield is very high in these counties, it can be argued that the current land quality being 
used is also high. An increase in acreage response due to changes in price expectation 
may suggest bringing less productive land into cotton production. Therefore, when yields 
are very high, an increase in price results in a smaller impact on acreage because the 
options for putting more land into production are limited. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Insurance participation for cotton and its effect on cotton acreage is examined for 
the entire U.S. cotton belt, and not just one or two regions. Planting restrictions were 
removed in 1996 for the first time in decades, allowing producers to respond to market 
and crop insurance incentives more than previously. Using simultaneous crop and 
acreage response equations, results show that counties with extremely low yields, usually 
those in dry land/rainfed regions, have more response to insurance participation compared to those with very high yields as the price expectation goes up. Moreover, 
counties with extremely low yields respond more to changes in expected price than 
counties with relatively high yields. An important policy implication of this result is that 
price supports are likely to benefit counties more that have relatively greater production 
risks. Furthermore, higher insurance subsidies lead to greater insurance participation and 
cotton production in relatively riskier counties. 
Another important issue addressed is the notion that crop insurance impacts 
acreage decisions. There has been increasing concern about the production-inducing 
effect, especially in riskier production areas, of crop insurance. Based on Goodwin et al. 
(2004), elasticities of acreage response on changes in insurance participation at data 
means for corn, soybeans and barley are 0.014, 0.0025 and 0.19, respectively. In the 
Mississippi portal and Southern Seaboard, Deal (2004) also found inelastic response of 
about -0.104 in 1990 to 1995 and 0.099 in 1996 to 2000. Findings of this study also 
support literature that claimed a positive but marginal effect of insurance participation on 
crop acreage. Specifically, results show that on average, a 1% increase in insurance 
participation causes an increase in cotton acreage of 0.198%.  
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2001, 83 (5), 1196-1203. Table 1. Crop Insurance Subsidies and those for Cotton, 1995-2005 
Year  Total USDA Subsidies 
(in million US$) 
Cotton Subsidies 
(in million US$) 
Cotton Share 
(in %) 
1995  7,242  30  0.41 
1996  7,274  647  8.9 
1997  7,455  595  7.98 
1998  12,358  1,163  9.41 
1999  21,572  1,721  7.98 
2000  23,391  1,850  7.91 
2001  22,441  3,033  13.52 
2002  12,949  2,389  18.45 
2003  16,438  2,697  16.41 
2004  12,533  1,654  13.2 
2005  21,057  3,331  15.82 
Total  164,710  19,110  11.6 
 
 Table 2. Variable Description and Expected Signs for Insurance Equation 





INSURANCE  Insurance participation measured as 





ACRES  Total acres planted for cotton over county’s 
total cropland acres 
NASS/   
Ag. Census 
+ 
SUBSIDYPERLB  Subsidy per lb of production measured by total 
subsidy over 5-year moving average county 
yield 
RMA/ NASS  + 
ROR  Rate of return from insurance measured as 
total indemnity over producer’s premium 
RMA  + 
EXPPRICE  Expected price for cotton ($/lb): Closing 
December Futures for the last four Fridays 
prior to the February sales closing date plus the 
expected basis (i.e., lagged basis of state price 
minus December Futures for the Fridays 
during the last quarter of trading) plus 
expected LDP if positive (i.e., December 
Futures in February minus lagged AWP basis 
using last quarter of year)  
AMS/NASS  + 
LAGYLD  Lagged yield (lbs./acre)  NASS  + 
EXPPRICE* 
LAGYLD 
Interaction between EXPPRICE and LAGYLD  AMS/NASS  - 
YLDVAR  Yield variability measured by moving 
coefficient of variation 
NASS  + 
BT  Bt cotton adoption rate  CIL  - 
D1  Dummy for years 2000 to 2001     
D2  Dummy for years 2002 to 2005     Table 3. Variable Description and Expected Signs for Cotton Acreage Equation 





ACRES  Total acres planted for cotton divided by a 
county’s total cropland acres  
NASS/   
Ag. Census  
 
Independent variables 
INSURANCE  Insurance participation measured as total 




EXPPRICE  Expected price for cotton ($/lb.) (please 
see table 2 above) 
AMS/NASS  + 
LAGYLD  Lagged yield (lbs./acre)  NASS  + 
EXPPRICE* 
LAGYLD 
Interaction between EXPPRICE and 
LAGYLD 
AMS/NASS  - 
YLDVAR  Yield variability measured by moving 
coefficient of variation 
NASS  - 
BT  Bt cotton adoption rate  CIL  + 
PICC  Expected price index of the major 3 
competing crops (corn, soybean, wheat) 
NASS  - 
D1  Dummy for years 2000 to 2001     
D2  Dummy for years 2002 to 2005     
 Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 
Delta  Southeast  Southwest  West  U.S.  Variables 
(21.2%)  (43.7%)  (28.9%)  (6.2%)  (100%) 
Dependent variables 
INSURANCE  0.545  0.725  0.784  0.482  0.689 
  (0.291)  (0.281)  (0.318)  (0.239)  (0.309) 
ACRES  0.214  0.24  0.173  0.121  0.208 
  (0.153)  (0.176)  (0.185)  (0.128)  (0.175) 
Independent variables 
SUBSIDYPERLB  0.021  0.029  0.044  0.012  0.031 
  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.009)  (0.019) 
ROR  2.35  2.429  2.361  2.333  2.387 
  (9.3)  (4.891)  (2.586)  (6.116)  (5.748) 
EXPPRICE  0.743  0.77  0.703  0.796  0.747 
  (0.117)  (0.124)  (0.112)  (0.13)  (0.123) 
LAGYLD  732  618  472  1,072  628 
  (168)  (169)  (236)  (304)  (249) 
EXPPRICE*LAGYLD  537  474  326  845  468 
  (121)  (142)  (160)  (253)  (197) 
YLDVAR  0.182  0.236  0.28  0.159  0.232 
  (0.066)  (0.098)  (0.116)  (0.1)  (0.106) 
BT  0.588  0.552  0.148  0.246  0.424 
  (0.291)  (0.247)  (0.102)  (0.276)  (0.298) 
PICC  0.958  0.954  0.977  0.861  0.956 
  (0.213)  (0.215)  (0.207)  (0.302)  (0.22) 
D1  0.098  0.102  0.101  0.108  0.101 
  (0.298)  (0.312)  (0.301)  (0.31)  (0.302) 
D2  0.386  0.376  0.405  0.385  0.387 
  (0.487)  (0.484)  (0.491)  (0.488)  (0.487) 
Other descriptors           
Planted  37,061  15,544  44,925  34,151  29,761 
  (34,483)  (15,108)  (68,515)  (52,576)  (45,984) 
Insured acres  31,544  14,329  43,704  27,492  27,292 
  (34,483)  (14,348)  (67,319)  (43,573)  (43,861) 
No. of observations = 4,637 
 Table 5. Fixed Effects Results 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable 




























































(1.2135)   
PICC 




   
0.0599** 
(0.0218) 
Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 5%(*) and 1%(**) levels.  
          Standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 6. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Reduced Form 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable 



































































Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 5%(*) and 1%(**) levels.  
          Standard errors in parentheses.  
 











































Figure 3. Marginal effects of expected price on cotton acreage given yield  
 
expectation 